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Much of the research examining institutional and social trust explores the factors that 
affect these concepts, including race and ethnicity. Such studies involve comparing different 
racial groups and using race as a discrete independent variable in their analysis. Few researchers 
have sought to explore social and institutional trust within a single racial group, and when they 
have, it has only been in White respondents. In addition, few researchers have tied institutional 
and social trust to understandings of racial inequality. Due to the complex social and historical 
circumstances of African Americans, I propose there is a pattern in the way Black respondents 
develop social and institutional trust that is specific to their experiences with, and 
conceptualizations of, racial inequality. To examine this, I use items from the cumulative 
General Social Survey (1988 – 2018) measuring respondents’ beliefs about racial inequality. 
Rather than comparing multiple racial groups, I isolate Black respondents so as not to position 
them as “other” in reference to White respondents, perpetuating the hegemony of White 
experience. Using binary logit and ordinary least squares regression models, I will explore how 
these racial ideology items affect institutional and social trust. These findings contribute to 
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Amid the civil unrest that has developed during the spring of 2020, the importance of 
understanding public opinion on racial inequality is very salient with hundreds of protests 
happening all across the United States and all over the world against police brutality. Racial 
inequality is rooted in the violence of American slavery and deliberate institutional 
disenfranchisement. Despite efforts made in law and policy, critical research in academia, and 
grassroots activism, there are still large gaps in life outcomes between White people and people 
of color. This issue seems most evident in Black/White differences in outcomes such as 
socioeconomic status and wealth (e.g. Conley 2000; Darity and Myers 2004; Darity and 
Nembhard 2000; Mitchell 2013; Kraus et a. 2019). In a democratic society, how can we justify 
these differences? What factors perpetuate this inequality? There are many possible explanations 
for this phenomenon to which people can subscribe. Researchers identify two major camps, 
person-centered or individualistic reasons, and structural reasons. These systems of belief do not 
oppose each other and can be—and often are—asserted by the same person (Hunt 2007).  
Individualistic explanations for racial inequality center on the failings of the individuals 
experiencing negative life outcomes. People who espouse this explanation argue that racial 
inequality stems from individual differences in will power, work ethic, or even natural abilities 
such as intelligence. In this view, it is these factors rather than race that explain differences in 
life outcomes. In contrast, structural explanations locate the cause of racial inequality in 
institutions and barriers built into the fabric of society. In this case, institutional racism and 
discrimination lead people to be treated differently by race, which in turn explains racial 
inequality in life outcomes. Structural explanations also highlight barriers to resources such as 
education and wealth which might aid in surmounting the obstacles of racism. Many researchers 
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(e.g., Hunt 2007; Kluegel 1990; Schuman et al. 1997) use items from the General Social Survey 
(GSS) to study these individualistic and structural explanations. Hunt (2007) specifically studied 
how race affects beliefs about racial inequality using the GSS items as the dependent variables. 
Instead, I examine these GSS items as independent variables to see if beliefs about racial 
inequality impact institutional and social trust.  
There is a large body of research that examines institutional and social trust. Much of the 
discourse centers around how to define trust (Abbott and Freeth 2008; Delhey, Newton and 
Welzel 2011; Newton 2001; Sturgis and Smith 2010) and theorizing how trust develops 
(Glanville and Paxton 2007; Marschall and Stolle 2004; Van Lange 2015). Authors of these 
studies discuss whether trust is primarily a social or psychological phenomenon and whether it is 
context specific. There is also discourse surrounding the validity of the survey questions that ask 
about trust (Delhey, Newton and Welzel 2011). Many have studied social trust as a major aspect 
of social capital, something that greatly impacts social cohesion and belief in political legitimacy 
(Coleman 1988; Putnam 1993).  
Researchers have also sought to define institutional trust (Cook and Gronke 2005; 
Khodyakov 2007) as well as to find the connection between the two concepts (Freitag and 
Bühlmann 2009; Putnam 1993; Sønderskov and Dinesen 2015; Twenge, Campbell, and Carter 
2014). Researchers found that inequality (Twenge, Campbell, and Carter 2014) and institutional 
integrity (Blanco and Ruiz 2013; Tyler 2001) have an impact on institutional trust. Factors such 
as political ideology (Gauchat 2012; Price and Romantan 2004) as well as levels of poverty 
(Twenge, Campbell, and Carter 2014) also have an impact on institutional trust. Researchers 
have explored the impact of race on both social and institutional trust as well, finding higher 
levels of social trust in White Americans (Smith 2010) and racial differences in perceptions of 
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different public institutions (Henderson et al. 1997, 2003; Klugman and Xu 2008). Black people 
also develop social trust in a way that is distinct from White people (Marschall and Stolle 2004).  
However, while past studies have considered race and ethnicity discrete demographic 
categories, they are also complex systems of identity that develop through varied processes of 
socialization, lived experience, and understandings of history (Gosine 2002). This system is 
particularly complex in African Americans, due to the history of racial enslavement, state-
sanctioned violence, and institutional racism. However, there is an apparent lack of research into 
the political attitudes of African Americans, especially as their own social group. Many 
researchers seek to compare racial and ethnic minorities to White people when studying social 
and institutional trust (Henderson et al. 1997; Marschall and Stolle 2004; Tyler 2001) as well as 
beliefs about racial inequality (Hinojosa and Park 2004; Hunt 2007; Kane and Kyyrö 2001; 
Kluegel and Smith 1982; McDonald 2001; Schuman and Krysan 1999; Smith 2014; Taylor and 
Merino 2011; Tuch and Hughes 1996). I argue that this perpetuates the hegemony and ubiquity 
of White experience and sets African Americans as “other,” an exception to the norm of 
Whiteness.  
It also implies homogeneity in Black political thought, framing African Americans as one 
monolithic group. Studies that focus on Whites’ racial attitudes (e.g. Bobo 1988; Bobo and 
Kluegel 1993; Gilens 1995; Schuman and Bobo 1988; Sears and Jessor 1996) acknowledge the 
multitude of experiences that White people from all different walks of life have. In order to 
acknowledge their subjectivity and complexity, African Americans ought to be afforded the 
same privilege. Many studies in other contexts already showcase both the organized nature of 
Black political thought (e.g. Aberbach and Walker 1970; Davis and Brown 2002; Sigelman and 
Tuch 1997) and the heterogeneity within this thought (e.g. Cathy Cohen 1999; Hwang, 
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Fitzpatrick, and Helms 1998; Neville et al. 2005; Seltzer and Smith 1985; Sigelman, Tuch, and 
Martin 2005). I would like to contribute to this body of research. 
I seek to explore whether Black respondents’ belief about racial differences in 
socioeconomic status affects their trust in people and their trust in civic institutions. Stated 
another way, how do Black people’s understandings of racial inequality affect their social and 
institutional trust? In order to answer this question, I will use data from the 1988 - 2018 GSS, 
focusing on respondents who identified as African American. I will use ordinary least squares 
and binary logit regression models to examine how Black respondents’ beliefs about racial 
inequality relate to confidence in institutions and trust in people. Specifically, I create scales of 
institutional confidence and social trust and regress them on respondents’ beliefs about the 
sources of racial inequalities. I then examine the individual measures of institutional confidence 
and social trust used to create the scale variables to determine whether the relationships of 
interest are specific to certain institutions or aspects of social trust. The regression models also 
include numerous control variables to isolate how respondents’ racial inequality beliefs relate to 
their institutional and social trust net of other demographic and political characteristics.  
BACKGROUND  
Explanations for Racial Inequality 
Understanding inequality and why it manifests has been a major topic of social science 
research. In 1994, Herrnstein and Murray wrote The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure 
in American Life, a controversial book in which they argued that intelligence is a fixed biological 
characteristic which has an inevitable direct impact on the life outcomes of individuals. 
Herrnstein and Murray claimed that inborn intelligence had a profound impact on a person’s 
position in the class hierarchy, and thus that class inequality was unavoidable and should be 
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accepted. There was no need for any intervention on the side of institutions. However, not long 
after, in 1996, Fischer et al. wrote Inequality by Design: Cracking the Bell Curve Myth, a critique 
of what was called “the bell curve argument.” They re-examined Herrnstein’s and Murray’s data 
and found that intelligence only accounted for five to ten percent of the variation in life outcomes 
and that larger structural issues such as negative stigma, segregation, unequal education, etc. 
were the real causes of inequality. These works represent the two major arguments for racial 
inequality, the individualist explanation where African Americans underperform because of 
innate intellectual inferiority or pathological ethnic culture (claims of laziness, irresponsibility, 
etc.) and the structural explanation. They not only reflect the discourse within academia but also 
the competing arguments held by the American public. 
A large body of sociological research documents persistent socioeconomic inequality 
between Black people and White people (e.g. Conley 2000, Darity and Myers 2004; Darity and 
Nembhard 2000; Mitchell 2013; Kraus et al. 2019). A related body of research examines public 
perceptions about the sources of this socioeconomic inequality. Many of these studies utilize the 
General Social Survey, which contains repeated measures of four items that examine 
respondents’ beliefs about racial inequality (e.g. Hunt 2007; Kluegel 1990; Schuman et al. 1997). 
They ask respondents whether they believe it results from discrimination, innate inferiority or 
disability, lack of education, or lack of will. Typically, these studies conceptualize discrimination 
and lack of education as structural explanations and disability and lack of will as individualistic 
explanations (Hunt 2007; Kluegel 1990; Schuman et al. 1997). This study takes the same 
approach. Hunt (2007) found that the use of innate inferiority as an explanation by non-Hispanic 
Whites has declined, but that they are not necessarily more likely to endorse discrimination as an 
explanation. Also, African Americans are more likely to endorse structural explanations than 
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Hispanics and non-Hispanic Whites, though this gap is decreasing over time. These findings 
support the idea that belief in these two types of arguments is impacted by race. 
 The individualistic and structural explanations have substantially different implications 
for persistent differences in wages, educational achievement, and other life outcomes between 
White people and Black people. Much research has been done specifically on White Americans’ 
beliefs about racial inequality (e.g. Kluegel and Smith 1982; McDonald 2001; Schuman and 
Krysan 1999; Tuch and Hughes 1996). According to Kluegel and Smith (1982), White 
Americans tend to deny the structural explanations for racial inequality, instead supporting the 
individualistic ones. Many also believe in the notion of “reverse racism,” the idea that people of 
color receive better treatment than White people (Jones et al. 2016). Kluegel and Smith argue 
these findings may lead to decreased support in programs created to assist African Americans, 
such as affirmative action (p. 530). In contrast, Tuch and Hughes (1996) find that whether White 
respondents understood the persistent negative impact of racial discrimination on the lives of 
African Americans was the most influential factor in their support for race-targeted support 
policies. They even argue that educating White Americans on this fact could potentially have a 
positive influence for their support of these policies (p. 739). These studies show how beliefs 
about racial inequality can impact public support of programs geared toward aiding African 
Americans overcome the obstacles of racism, programs which greatly impact said inequality. 
Another factor that affects beliefs about racial inequality in addition to race is education. 
Kane and Kyyrö (2001) used the data from the 1996 General Social Survey and found that while 
increased education had a positive impact on the rejection of segregation and individualistic 
explanations for inequality, it had less of an impact on recognizing discrimination or endorsing 
group-level remedies. This suggests that education decreases the use of individualistic and 
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victim-blaming explanations but does not necessarily increase the use of structural explanations. 
In this way, individualistic and structural explanations for racial inequality are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive or diametrically opposed, a point supported by other studies (e.g. Tuch and 
Hughes 1996). To account for this complexity, years of education will be included as a control 
variable in this study. 
Researchers have also examined the impact of religion on beliefs about racial inequality 
and found that religious beliefs impact both the denial of structural explanations and the 
affirmation of individualistic explanations (Hinojosa and Park 2004). However, both Black and 
White Protestants were not found to be uniquely conservative when other factors were controlled 
(Taylor and Merino 2011). This again complicates how race interacts with different factors when 
influencing beliefs about racial inequality. Religion will be used as a variable in this study as 
well. Another factor that researchers explored was geographic location. Carter and Cora (2012) 
have found, also using the General Social Survey, that the gap between urban residents and rural 
residents has increased, with rural residents blaming inequality on individuals. In addition, Carter 
et al. (2014) found that living outside of the South had a larger impact on respondents’ beliefs 
about racial inequality than living in the South. Due to this, I will also control for whether 
respondents lived in the South. Overall, beliefs about racial inequality are impacted in complex 
ways by multiple variables, which are therefore included as controls in the present study. 
Most relevant to the present study, many researchers have also examined the intersections 
of these various factors with race. Kane and Kyyrö (2001) found that the impact of education 
was evident for White men, White women, and Black men but not for Black women. This 
finding also necessitates controlling for gender. When it comes to the impact of religion, 
Christian Whites were found to have more conservative views on racial inequality than non-
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Christian Whites, and more generally Whites were less likely to favor structural explanations and 
more likely to favor individualistic explanations than Blacks (Taylor and Merino 2011). Also, 
researchers argue that whatever “cultural toolkit” is being taught by “Predominantly White 
Judeo-Christian religious traditions” does not affect Black worshippers’ beliefs about racial 
inequality in any consistent way (Hinojosa and Park 2004). This again supports the idea that 
African Americans’ patterns of belief operate differently than those of Whites, necessitating a 
study into their beliefs without comparing them to White people.  
Another study explores how Black people’s beliefs about racial inequality have changed 
over time, finding that they are less inclined to affirm structural explanations due to period 
effects, but the increase in individualistic explanations is primarily due to cohort effects (Smith 
2014). This indicates that decreasing subscription to structural explanations for racial inequality 
is impacted by changing opinions over time, perhaps impacted by the election of President 
Obama or other events that may seem to run counter to institutional racism in the eyes of African 
Americans. However, increasing support for individualistic explanations for racial inequality 
may be due to generational shifts. Perhaps younger African Americans internalize the 
individualistic explanations more so than their older counterparts. In addition, while the latest 
GSS data included in this study comes from 2018, the middle of President Trump’s 
administration, most of it comes from before. It will be interesting to see how beliefs about racial 
inequality change after his presidency. With the apparent impact of historical events and 
generational differences, I will include age as a control variable. Since the data I examine are 
comprised of pooled cross-sections, I include fixed effects for survey year to account for 
unobserved differences between years. It is important to note however, that holding either 
structural or individualistic beliefs about racial inequality regardless of one’s race is not 
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necessarily equivalent to holding racist beliefs. While similar, holding individualistic beliefs is 
more akin to victim blaming than racism, and in the Black respondents of this study I see it as 
more a denial of racism, both microlevel and macrolevel.  
When it comes to beliefs about racial inequality, race interacts with other variables in 
complex ways, indicating the necessity for further study into this mechanism. Much research has 
already been done on the attitudes of White Americans as discussed previously. I aim to study 
African Americans’ attitudes so to afford them the same complexity in their beliefs as Whites. 
Social Trust 
Altogether, there is a large body of research that has examined the causes of people’s 
ideas about racial inequality. However, there is substantially less attention paid to the 
consequences of these beliefs. One potentially important implication of differences in beliefs 
about racial inequality is that it may undermine social and institutional trust.  
How researchers define trust 
There is some debate into whether the definition of social trust is as simple or intuitive as 
previously thought. Some scholars have found discrepancies in respondents’ interpretations of 
questions in different national and international surveys that ask about social trust (Sturgis and 
Smith 2010). Others have explored the amount and type of people included in respondents’ 
interpretations of “most people,” the phrase commonly used in social trust questions. This is 
called the “radius of trust” (Delhey, Newton and Welzel 2011). Other scholars further distinguish 
between the concepts of trustworthiness and trustfulness, arguing that the questions most often 
used to measure social trust measure the extent to which respondents believe in the 
trustworthiness of the people in the environment rather than their own individual ability to trust 
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others (Abbott and Freeth 2008). This is important considering the various theories about how 
social trust is developed.  
How social trust develops. 
There are many proposed theories as to how trust develops. Some scholars explored the 
possibility of trust being a psychological disposition. Glanville and Paxton (2007) called this the 
“psychological propensity model” where trust is thought to be an overall personality trait 
developed from events that happened in childhood. Others explored whether people were 
predisposed to different levels of trust towards others and if this trait was fixed (Marschall and 
Stolle 2004). Others have also studied the impact of genetics on social trust and political leanings 
(Hatemi and McDermott 2012; Sturgis et al. 2009).These models imply that trust develops 
independent of the context in which people are found or are referencing when asked about their 
general trust in people. However, evidence supports the social learning model of social trust 
development where which trust is developed from localized contemporary experiences with 
others (Glanville and Paxton 2007). From there, scholars explore whether social trust, as the 
totality of multiple interactions, contributes to an overall theory of human nature which people 
employ to decide others’ trustworthiness (Marschall and Stolle 2004). This would also be 
independent of context.  
I believe these theories which ignore momentary, positional, and situational context do 
not accurately show how social trust is developed. An alternative theory asserts that social trust 
is developed in situ and depends very much on the person’s environment. Marschall and Stolle 
(2004) studied the effect of race and neighborhood context and found that the process of 
developing social trust was different for Black respondents and White respondents and was 
based on the diversity of people with whom they interacted. Indeed, social trust is not 
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psychological or genetic, and it is heavily rooted in interaction (Van Lange 2015). In addition to 
being context specific, trust is also learned through cultural socialization, and the standards 
people use to judge whether others are trustworthy depends on the culture of their ethnic 
communities (Uslaner 2008).1 Some scholars found that people with strong ties to their ethnic 
group have lower levels of civic engagement, something previously stated to be linked to social 
trust. People with weaker ties to their ethnic group have higher levels of civic participation 
(Uslaner and Conley 2003). Hooghe (2007) argues that social trust is an aspect of social capital 
most vulnerable to the effects of diversity, and that other scholars in the field should study how 
societies deal with that diversity in order to understand the levels of social trust and social 
capital. 
I view social trust as the belief in the trustworthiness of the people around us (Newton 
2001). It is essential to managing the risks that always come with relationships, especially when 
formal means of control such as laws and law enforcement are insufficient or incapable of 
incurring the cost of such maintenance (Nooteboom 2007). Trust among members of a 
community facilitates the cooperation necessary for effective social and political organizing, 
which in turn impacts government performance in a positive way, making institutions more 
effective, more representative of the desires of the people, and more legitimate (Newton 2001). 
This relational value makes trust in those around us a major element of social capital (Putnam 
1993). Social capital— the networks and social relationships we belong to—can be used as a 
resource for means of cooperation, negotiation and compromise (Coleman 1988). For example, 
countries with higher levels of social trust tend to have higher levels of trust in their political 
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institutions since they tend to believe that the performance of their political system and officials 
are satisfactory (Newton 2001). Overall, trust is essential to the proper functioning of a 
democracy as it is correlated with increased civil engagement (Putman 1993). This is particularly 
pertinent to the present study as I am looking at levels of social and institutional trust in African 
Americans. The results can inform how we improve our institutions through understanding what 
factors impact how African Americans develop trust, making these institutions more 
representative of the desires of this group. 
Factors that affect social trust. 
Due to its importance for civic engagement and social cohesion, it is important to know 
what factors impact the levels of social trust. As previously stated, ethnic background has a 
strong effect on social trust as cultural attitudes toward human nature are passed down through 
generations (Uslaner 2008). In addition, scholars have explored the importance of neighborhood 
context and race in levels of social trust, finding that racial diversity and perceived neighborhood 
sociability positively affect social trust in Black community members but not in White 
community members. Also, the status of the neighborhood—informed by education levels and 
neighborhood problems—negatively affects social trust in White residents but not Black 
residents (Marschall and Stolle 2004). This is further evidence that social trust develops 
differently in Black respondents than in White respondents.  
Marschall and Stolle (2004, p.146) state that “contexts in which close social interactions 
with individuals representing a broad, rather than narrow sampling of society take place increase 
the likelihood that trust is transferred to citizens of the ‘outside’ world,” and that Black residents 
“who are situated in these types of neighborhoods are more likely to make the leap of faith in 
extending trustworthiness to others whom they do not know.” In other words, African American 
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respondents who live in diverse neighborhoods are more likely to have high levels of social trust. 
What is interesting to know is if this relationship is impacted by beliefs about racial inequality. 
This would shed light on whether neighborhood diversity is related to subscribing to individuals’ 
explanations for racial inequality. Unfortunately, this is outside the scope of the present study but 
could be a topic for future research. 
 In addition to neighborhood context, scholars have also sought to explore how social 
class affects social trust, finding that it only does in wealthy countries (Hamamura 2012). Since 
the United States is a wealthy country, I will include income as a measure of social class as a 
control variable in this study. Inequality also has a negative effect on social trust (Jordahl 2007; 
Uslaner and Brown 2005), which then effects participation in community organizations (Uslaner 
and Brown 2005). Finally, scholars have also explored how the power-sharing quality of 
institutions—the degree to which they are corrupt, act in the interest of social welfare, and how 
much they value the interests of the many—as an aspect of institutional performance and 
efficacy affects social trust (Freitag and Bülhlmann 2009), a theory also connected to 
institutional trust which will be discussed below.  
Overall, while many of these studies explore a multitude of factors that affect social trust, 
including ethnic background, neighborhood context, social class, levels of inequality, and the 
quality of institutions, they do not account for beliefs about racial inequality. Perhaps social 
class, levels of inequality, and perceptions of institutions are related to beliefs about racial 
inequality, especially for African Americans. I argue that these experiences may inform which 
explanations individuals subscribe to, which is then related to their social trust. In addition, the 
extant studies that explore race and ethnicity compare multiple groups to each other. As I stated 
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previously, I aim to isolate African Americans to better account for their unique position in 
society. 
Institutional Trust 
In addition to its potential importance to social trust, beliefs about racial inequality may 
also shape institutional trust. Institutional trust is found to have a causal effect on social trust 
(Sønderskov and Dinesen 2015), and Khodyakov (2007) proposed a new three-point model 
which includes two types of social trust—trust in close ties and generalized trust—and 
institutional trust all in the same social mechanism. As with social trust, there is discourse among 
scholars regarding the defining and operationalizing of institutional trust. Cook and Gronke 
(2005) proposed a new operationalization of institutional trust which distinguishes active trust 
and distrust from general trust and distrust, wherein active trust is the belief in the moral integrity 
of the government, and active distrust is the belief in the moral corruption of the government. 
Also, elements like agency and temporality need to be accounted for in defining institutional 
trust (Khodyakov 2007). This accounts for the individual spatial and temporal contexts in which 
people find themselves and how these experiences inform how they feel about institutions. 
Both social and institutional trust have decreased since the 1970s (Putnam 1993; Twenge, 
Campbell, and Carter 2014). Researchers have sought to identify factors which affect the 
public’s trust in large institutions. High levels of inequality negatively affect social trust and high 
levels of poverty negatively affect institutional trust (Twenge, Campbell, and Carter 2014). 
Another factor that scholars have studied is the effect of political ideology and polarization on 
institutional trust (Gauchat 2012; Price and Romantan 2004), specifically their effect on trust in 
the Supreme Court, the presidency and in Congress (Price and Romantan 2004). Due to these 
effects, political ideology will be used as a control variable in this study.  
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Many other researchers have studied racial differences in perceptions of specific public 
institutions such as the criminal justice system (Henderson et al. 1997; Tyler 2001). High crime 
rates and rates of violence negatively impact institutional trust (Blanco and Ruiz 2013). In their 
study, trust in the criminal justice system was assumed to be based on perceptions of inefficiency 
and low job performance, but Tyler (2001) proposed the alternative theory that trust in the 
criminal justice system is based on the perceived fairness of the system’s procedures. According 
to Tyler, perceptions of procedural fairness are linked to trust in this institution. Due to the 
disproportionate number of African Americans living in areas of high crime and high violence, 
this may also negatively impact institutional trust. While this is one specific institution, I believe 
that this is an example of how the contexts in which people live as well as their perceptions of 
institutional efficacy and fairness can impact institutional trust. More importantly, African 
Americans with experiences such as these may be more inclined to believe in structural 
explanations for inequality, which may mediate their trust in institutions. 
Studies on Black Public Opinion 
As previously stated, I am specifically interested in the beliefs and attitudes of African 
Americans. Scholar Bobo (2000) expressed the need to return to a Du Boisian sociological 
theory of race and racism, which will be useful in the present study in understanding African 
American’s attitudes about racial inequality and their social and institutional trust. I believe the 
respondents’ beliefs about racial inequality are based on their experiences, their perceptions of 
themselves, and their perceptions of how other people see them. This then affects their social and 
institutional trust. On average, African Americans have less trust in people than White 
Americans even when controlling for other variables (Smith 2010). Indeed, many scholars have 
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studied the impact of race on various attitudinal measures (Seltzer and Smith 1985), including 
social trust (Marschall and Stolle 2004) and institutional trust (Henderson et al. 1997). 
However, much of said research centers on the attitudes of Whites. Many scholars have 
studied the effect of White Americans’ racial attitudes toward government assistance programs 
(Gilens 1995), African Americans’ housing rights (Schuman and Bobo 1988), and Affirmative 
Action (Bobo 1988). Scholars have tried to explore the role of White racism in White’s racial 
policy attitudes (Sears and Jessor 1996), testing the validity of more individualist explanations 
for Whites’ opposition to these programs in comparison to race-based explanations. Many found 
that Whites’ negative views of African Americans as well as perceived group threat were the 
main factors in their opposition to these programs. In fact, scholars found that White Americans 
opposed all policies they perceived to be race targeted as they believed it to be discrimination 
against Whites (Bobo and Kluegel 1993). In a paper based on a lecture he gave in London in 
2011, Bonilla-Silva (2011) talked about the “racial grammar” present in American culture that 
normalizes White supremacy and hegemony and facilitates the invisibility of racial domination. 
The findings of many of the studies previously referenced illustrate the impact of this racial 
grammar as well as the post racial society many White people believe we live in. I argue that it is 
especially meaningful to study the political attitudes of African Americans due to the impact of 
historical phenomena, institutional and social trust, organizing and consumption patterns among 
African Americans (Vercellotti and Brewer 2006). In addition, it is important to study African 
Americans on their own terms rather than in comparison to Whites, as such comparative studies 
run the risk of maintaining the assumption of Whiteness as normal and Blackness as exception. 
This will help disrupt that racial grammar and assumption or post-racism.  
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Scholars have found evidence of a Black political community, an ideology militantly 
opposed to oppression (Aberbach and Walker 1970; Davis and Brown 2002). This Black 
political community must also face a much larger and equally militant White political 
community that has a larger effect on policy. This erodes the trust Black people have in the 
government which favor the interests of Whites. This political ideology focused on Black power 
and Black liberation, and also transcended class in their study with African Americans of higher 
socioeconomic status being just as or more militant than their poorer counterparts (Aberbach and 
Walker 1970). This Black nationalist ideology persisted when controlling for other demographic 
factors and was associated with a disdain for White people but not for any other social group 
such as queer people, feminists, middle-class blacks and black conservatives (Davis and Brown 
2002). In a study on college students, Black students reported more negative interactions with 
and perceptions of White students than White students of Black students (Stephan et al. 2002). 
Scholars also found that this “black nationalist belief system also correlates with intense 
perceptions of racism in society and less support for systemic means for combating perceived 
racial injustice” (Davis and Brown 2002, p. 239). In addition, research shows that African 
Americans’ perception of Whites’ negative views of them are generally accurate (Sigelman and 
Tuch 1997). This Black nationalist ideology could impact beliefs about racial inequality, perhaps 
making African Americans who believe in this ideology more likely to subscribe to institutional 
explanations such as discrimination than African Americans who do not believe in this ideology. 
Negative experiences with White people could impact their trust in people. These simultaneously 
impact “perceptions of racism in society” as stated before and could decrease their faith in 
institutions’ ability to eradicate it. This then may decrease institutional trust.  
For this study then, my first hypothesis is: 
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Hypothesis 1: Among African Americans, those who believe in structural 
explanations for racial inequality have less social trust. 
And, in contrast, my next hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 2: Among African Americans, those who believe in individualistic 
explanations for racial inequality have more social trust. 
In addition, I also hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3: Among African Americans, those who believe in structural 
explanations for racial inequality have less institutional trust. 
And, in contrast, my final hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 4: Among African Americans, those who believe in individualistic 
explanations for racial inequality have more institutional trust. 
These are the ideas I seek to explore in this study. While there is not a lack of literature 
on Black public opinion, I’d like to make this contribution in understanding how Black people’s 
beliefs about racial inequality impact their sense of social and institutional trust. However, 
African Americans are not homogeneous. Many scholars have explored the differences in 
political beliefs among them (Cathy Cohen 1999; Hwang, Fitzpatrick, and Helms 1998; Neville 
et al. 2005; Seltzer and Smith 1985; Sigelman, Tuch, and Martin 2005). Cohen (1999) speaks 
extensively about the perceived homogeneity in Black political thought but shows through the 
lens of the AIDS crisis in the 1980s and 1990s how natural cleavages in the identities, 
experiences, and environments of Black people created highly varying political ideologies. 
Sigelman, Tuch, and Martin (2005) found that age, region, and the size of the city respondents 
lived in had an impact on their preference for either the label “African-American” or “Black.” 
Moreover, they found that respondents were almost evenly split, implying differences in political 
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ideology even on what to label ourselves. Also, when it comes to political ideology, African 
Americans are generally more liberal than Whites, but the extent differs within African 
Americans by gender, age, income, education level, region, and type of political policy in 
question (Seltzer and Smith 1985). Middle-class African Americans were more critical of the 
system of stratification than lower-class African Americans, which perhaps is evidence of more 
ethnic competition among them (Hwang, Fitzpatrick, and Helms 1998). In fact, some propose 
that lower-class African Americans constitute a possible untapped conservative constituency 
considering their more conservative views on social and fiscal policies (Seltzer and Smith 1985) 
Even when it comes to racial ideology there is heterogeneity. There is multiplicity in 
Black psychology, and the degree to which a person adopts the popular color-blind mindset 
varies from person to person and influences how they conceptualize racial inequality. The 
findings of Neville et al. (2005, p.40) support the link between color-blind racial ideology and 
what they call “psychological false consciousness” or “the degree to which one adopts a 
cognitive framework that works against his or her own individual or social group interest” in 
African Americans. Respondents with psychological false consciousness had more interracial 
friendships while those with “racialized egalitarian consciousness” had more intra-racial 
friendships. This indicated a higher connection to one’s own racial group. Complexity like this 
complicates the patterns of ideology African Americans follow. 
 Overall, race interacts with multiple variables in impacting beliefs about racial inequality. 
In addition to intersecting demographic characteristics, subscribing to a black nationalist 
ideology also impacts their beliefs. I argue that this then impacts their perceptions of their 
interactions with people outside their race—particularly White people—perhaps emphasizing the 
more negative ones. This then hinders the development of their sense of social trust. In addition, 
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this may also decrease their faith in both the ability of institutions to do something about racial 
inequities and when such interventions are morally acceptable. I argue that this will negatively 
impact their institutional trust. This is the essence of this study, and I outline how I will go about 
testing these hypotheses in the sections below. 
DATA  
I will use data from the cumulative General Social Survey (Smith et al. 2018). The survey 
has been conducted by the National Opinion Research Center annually or biennially since 1972. 
It utilizes in-person interviews given to adults in US households chosen by proportional 
sampling techniques. The survey used a modified probability sampling design for most of the 
years of issuance. The primary sampling units were Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas and 
non-metropolitan counties which were then stratified by race, age, and region before selection. In 
the second stage of sampling, the sampling units were narrowed to block groups and 
enumeration districts within the counties and Standard Metropolitan Statistical areas. These were 
then stratified by race and income before selection. In the third stage of sampling, blocks were 
selected based on probabilities proportional to their size. The average cluster had five 
respondents. The sampling frame changed multiple times throughout the survey’s issuance, so 
sampling weights are used to account for the complex design. White respondents make up 80% 
of the total sample while black respondents make up about 14%, or 9,187 of the 64,814.   
The sample is proportional to the data gathered in the US Census and thus is 
generalizable to the population of the United States. However, for this study only the Black 
respondents will be analyzed and only cases with complete data will be used. As stated 
previously, many socio-historical factors set African Americans apart as a unique social group. 
However, there is heterogeneity in the political ideas held in the Black community, and this 
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complexity must be accounted for. It is important to hold African Americans to their own 
standard instead of setting them against White people. In order to affirm their subjectivity and 




The dependent variables are institutional and social trust. To measure trust in institutions, 
I used a series of survey questions about public institutions and the people who work in them. 
Respondents were read the following statement: “As far as the people running these institutions 
are concerned, would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, or 
hardly any confidence at all in them?” Respondents then were read a list of 13 institutions, 
including the US Supreme Court, the Scientific Community, the US Congress, the US Military, 
Television, Medicine, Banks and Financial Institutions, Major Companies, Organized Religion, 
Education, the Executive Branch of Federal Government, Organized Labor, and the Press. I 
recoded the variable to focus on those with “a great deal” of confidence compared to those with 
“only some” and “hardly any” confidence. From here forward I will be talking to about 
“confidence” in institutions rather than “trust” in institutions since this is the verbiage used in the 
GSS items. This is with the understanding that the terms are conceptually synonymous in this 
study. I first examine a standardized scale based on all 13 items measures to determine whether 
there is a relationship between explanations of racial inequality and global institutional trust. The 
interitem correlation among the 13 survey questions is strong (α=.83), suggesting that they 
effectively tap the underlying construct of institutional confidence. I then examine each of these 
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13 items separately to determine whether the theorized relationships between explanations of 
racial inequality are specific to institutions.  
To measure social trust, I used 3 items on the GSS. One asks respondents “Generally 
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in 
dealing with people?” to which they can respond “can trust,” “cannot trust,” or “depends” 
(volunteered). Another item asks respondents “Would you say that most of the time people try to 
be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves?” to which they can respond 
“Helpful,” “Lookout for self,” or “depends” (volunteered). Finally, I use an item that asks 
respondents “Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, 
or would they try to be fair?” to which they can respond “Take advantage,” “Fair,” or “depends” 
(volunteered). All three variables are recoded dichotomously to compare responses to “can 
trust,”, helpful, and “fair” to the rest. I combine them into a scale to examine social trust in 
general. The interitem correlation is moderate (α=.55), suggesting that the scale is a valid 
measure of social trust. After analyzing the social trust scale, I then examine the three items 
separately. Descriptive statistics for all the dependent variables are presented in table 1.  
[INSERT TABLE 1]  
Independent Variables 
The independent variables in this investigation are perceptions of the causes of racial 
inequality. To capture these beliefs, I use four survey items that measure respondents’ 
thoughts on why there are differences in jobs, income, and housing between white people and 
black people. Respondents were read the following statement: “On the average (Negroes/ 
Blacks/ African-Americans) have worse jobs, income, and housing than white people.” 
Respondents then were asked four questions about the causes of these inequalities: “Do you 
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think these differences are mainly due to discrimination?” “Do you think these differences are 
because most (Negroes/ Blacks/African-Americans) have less in-born ability to learn?” “Do you 
think these differences are because most (Negroes/Blacks/African-Americans) don't have the 
chance for education that it takes to rise out of poverty?” “Do you think these differences are 
because most (Negroes/Blacks/African-Americans) just don't have the motivation or will power 
to pull themselves up out of poverty?” The labels used in the GSS for African Americans varied 
across the years as indicated in the parentheses. Respondents were asked to answer either yes or 
no after each of these four questions. Below, I categorize explanations for racial inequality based 
on discrimination and education as “structural”, and explanations based on in-born ability and 
will power as “individualistic.” The descriptive statistics for each of these are provided in table 
2.2   
Based on the theoretical framework developed earlier, I use these four specific survey 
variables to create measures of four general explanations for Black-White differences, including 
structural explanations, individual explanations, explanations that include structural and 
individual elements, and explanations that include neither of these elements. Specifically, I set 
the first category, “person” based or individualistic explanations, to include respondents who 
answered “yes” to “in-born disability” and/or “lack of will” as explanations for racial inequality 
and no to the other options. Next, I set the second category, “mixed” or both individualistic and 
structural explanations, to include respondents who answered “yes” to explanations that count as 
both individualistic and structural (e.g. “discrimination” and “lack of will”). Then, I set the third 
category, “structural” explanations, to include respondents who answered “yes” to 
                                                           
2
 Cases with missing data were handled via listwise deletion and removed from the main analysis, which is a 
common strategy for analyses of GSS data. 
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“discrimination” and/or “lack of education” as explanations for racial inequality and no to the 
other options. Finally, I set the fourth category, “none,” to include respondents who answered 
“no” to all the explanations. Descriptive statistics for these variables are provided in Table 2.   
Control Variables 
To isolate the relationship between social and institutional trust and racial difference 
ideology, the regression models control for several other variables associated with cleavages in 
public opinion. These include income, education, age, sex, region, religiosity, and political 
views. Income is measured as household income in constant dollars which is then log 
transformed. Education is measured in years and ranges from 1 to 20. Age is also measured in 
years, and ranges from 18-89. Sex is measured as a dichotomous variable based on whether the 
respondent is identified as female. Region is measured as a dichotomous variable indicating 
whether the respondent lives in the South. Religiosity is measured using an item that asks how 
often respondents attend religious services on a nine-point scale ranging from (1) never to (9) 
more than once a week. Political views are measured using a seven-point self-identification scale 
ranging from (1) “extremely liberal” to (7) “extremely conservative.” Church attendance and 
political views are used as continuous variables in the models. I aggregate data from all survey 
years where variables of interest are included in order to maximize the sample size. I therefore 
include fixed effects for survey year to account for unobserved heterogeneity associated with 
survey years. Descriptive statistics for the control variables are provided in table 2.  
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
METHODS 
The analysis proceeds in two stages. First, I analyze the relationships between 
explanations for racial inequality and trust in institutions. Second, I analyze the relationships 
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between explanations for racial inequality and social trust. At both stages, I first use ordinary 
least squares regression to examine the latent institutional and social trust scales. I then use 
binary logit regressions to examine the institutional and social trust items separately. To interpret 
regression results, I use predicted probabilities. All analyses use the recommended sampling 
weights 
RESULTS 
Confidence in Institutions  
Tables 3 and 4 contain results from regressions of institutional trust on respondents’ 
beliefs about racial inequality and control variables. For all regression models, the category 
representing “individual” explanations is used as the reference category for the key variable 
measuring respondents’ beliefs about the causes of racial inequality. The first model in the table 
regresses the institutional trust scale on beliefs about racial inequality and controls. The results 
suggest that being female, years of education, income, and survey year had negative effects on 
institutional trust while living in the South and religious service attendance had a positive effect. 
Put another way, female respondents generally have lower predicted levels of institutional trust 
compared to males. In addition, respondents with higher levels of education and income have 
less institutional trust compared to those with less education and income. The results also show 
that in general, institutional trust decreased over time (fixed effects for survey year not shown). 
In contrast, respondents living in the South as well as those who attend religious services more 
frequently had higher levels of institutional trust. All other variables were not statistically 
significant. These results are interesting to say the least with implications that could be explored 
in future studies. For the present paper, we will move forward to focus on the key independent 
variable, respondents’ beliefs about racial inequality. 
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[INSERT TABLE 3] 
When it comes to institutional trust, the scale ranges from -1.58 and 1.48 units. 
According to the regression model, beliefs about racial inequality have statistically significant 
effects on institutional trust. Holding all variables constant, respondents who have individualistic 
beliefs about racial inequality are predicted to have higher levels of institutional trust than those 
who have structural beliefs about racial inequality. These results support hypotheses 1 and 2 in 
that African American respondents who believe in structural explanations for racial inequality 
have a lower probability of having trust in institutions while those who believe in individualistic 
explanations have a higher probability when holding all other variables constant. The left-hand 
panel in figure 1 illustrates this pattern more concretely. It contains the predicted value of the 
institutional confidence scale associated with each explanation for racial inequality. It shows that 
the expected level of institutional confidence is significantly lower for those who hold structural 
explanations for racial inequality compared to those who hold individual explanations.  
[INSERT FIGURE 1] 
 The remainder of Tables 3 and 5 contain the results from the binary logit regressions of 
the 13 measures of trust in institutions used to construct the institutional trust scale. According to 
my models, the key variable measuring structural and individualistic beliefs about racial 
inequality did not have a statistically significant effect on whether respondents have “a great 
deal” of confidence in the US Supreme Court, the Scientific Community, Medicine, Organized 
Religion, Organized Labor, and the Press. However, structural explanations for inequality are 
associated with significantly less trust in several institutions, including Congress, the military, 
TV, banks, major companies, the education system, and the executive branch. Below, I focus my 
discussion of the institutions where the beliefs about racial inequality are associated with 
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statistically significant differences in institutional trust. To interpret the relationship between 
institutional trust and explanations for racial inequality, Table 4 contains the predicted 
probability of trusting institutions associated with each explanation for racial inequality. 
Predications are based on the regression results in Tables 3 and 5 and are computed to reflect the 
probability of trusting an institution when control variables are set to their means. 
[INSERT TABLE 4] 
For Congress, the predicted probability of a respondent who believed in individualistic 
explanations for racial inequality having confidence in this institution is about .16. In contrast, 
the predicted probability of confidence in Congress for a respondent who believes in structural 
explanations for racial inequality is only about .10. The predicted probability of a respondent 
who believes in a mixture of individualistic and structural explanations is about .13. The 
predicted probability of a respondent who believe in neither individualistic nor structural 
explanations is about .11. Importantly, the difference in probabilities between individual and 
structural explanations is significantly different (p < .05). These results support Hypotheses 1 
and 2 in that African American respondents who believe in structural explanations for racial 
inequality have a lower probability of having trust in this institution while those who believe in 
individualistic explanations have a higher probability when holding all other variables constant. 
The regression coefficients from which these predicted probabilities are derived are presented in 
Table 3. 
For the Military, the predicted probability of a respondent who believed in individualistic 
explanations for racial inequality having confidence in this institution is about .48. In contrast, 
the predicted probability of confidence in the military for a respondent who believes in structural 
explanations for racial inequality is only about .38. The predicted probability of a respondent 
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who believes in a mixture of individualistic and structural explanations is about .38. The 
predicted probability of a respondent who believe in neither individualistic nor structural 
explanations is about .40. Importantly, the difference in probabilities between individual and 
structural explanations is significantly different (p < .05). These results support Hypotheses 1 
and 2 in that African American respondents who believe in structural explanations for racial 
inequality have a lower probability of having trust in this institution while those who believe in 
individualistic explanations have a higher probability when holding all other variables constant. 
The regression coefficients from which these predicted probabilities are derived are presented in 
Table 3. 
For Television, the predicted probability of a respondent who believed in individualistic 
explanations for racial inequality having confidence in this institution is about .17. In contrast, 
the predicted probability of confidence in TV for a respondent who believes in structural 
explanations for racial inequality is only about .11. The predicted probability of a respondent 
who believes in a mixture of individualistic and structural explanations is about .17. The 
predicted probability of a respondent who believe in neither individualistic nor structural 
explanations is about .13. Importantly, the difference in probabilities between individual and 
structural explanations is borderline significantly different (p < .10). These results somewhat 
support Hypotheses 1 and 2 in that African American respondents who believe in structural 
explanations for racial inequality have a lower probability of having trust in this institution while 
those who believe in individualistic explanations have a higher probability when holding all 
other variables constant. The regression coefficients from which these predicted probabilities are 
derived are presented in Table 3. 
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For Banks and other Financial Institutions, the predicted probability of a respondent who 
believed in individualistic explanations for racial inequality having confidence in this institution 
is about .26. The predicted probability of a respondent who believes in structural explanations for 
racial inequality is about .15. The predicted probability of a respondent who believes in a 
mixture of individualistic and structural explanations is about .20. The predicted probability who 
believe in neither individualistic nor structural explanations is about .22. Importantly, the 
difference in probabilities between individual and structural explanations is significantly 
different (p < .05). These results support Hypotheses 1 and 2 in that African American 
respondents who believe in structural explanations for racial inequality have a lower probability 
of having trust in this institution while those who believe in individualistic explanations have a 
higher probability when holding all other variables constant. The regression coefficients from 
which these predicted probabilities are derived are presented in Table 5. 
[INSERT TABLE 5] 
For Major Companies, the predicted probability of a respondent who believed in 
individualistic explanations for racial inequality having confidence in this institution is about .17. 
In contrast, the predicted probability of confidence in major companies for a respondent who 
believes in structural explanations for racial inequality is only about .09. The predicted 
probability of a respondent who believes in a mixture of individualistic and structural 
explanations is about .18. The predicted probability of a respondent who believe in neither 
individualistic nor structural explanations is about .14. Importantly, the difference in 
probabilities between individual and structural explanations is significantly different (p < .05). 
These results support Hypotheses 1 and 2 in that African American respondents who believe in 
structural explanations for racial inequality have a lower probability of having trust in this 
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institution while those who believe in individualistic explanations have a higher probability when 
holding all other variables constant. The regression coefficients from which these predicted 
probabilities are derived are presented in Table 5. 
For Education, the predicted probability of a respondent who believed in individualistic 
explanations for racial inequality having confidence in this institution is about .44. The predicted 
probability of a respondent who believes in structural explanations for racial inequality is about 
.25. The predicted probability of a respondent who believes in a mixture of individualistic and 
structural explanations is about .34. The predicted probability who believe in neither 
individualistic nor structural explanations is about .37. Importantly, the difference in 
probabilities between individual and structural explanations is significantly different (p < .05). 
These results support Hypotheses 1 and 2 in that African American respondents who believe in 
structural explanations for racial inequality have a lower probability of having trust in this 
institution while those who believe in individualistic explanations have a higher probability when 
holding all other variables constant. The regression coefficients from which these predicted 
probabilities are derived are presented in Table 5. 
For the Executive Branch of the Federal Government, the predicted probability of a 
respondent who believed in individualistic explanations for racial inequality having confidence 
in this institution is about .18. The predicted probability of a respondent who believes in 
structural explanations for racial inequality is about .11. The predicted probability of a 
respondent who believes in a mixture of individualistic and structural explanations is about .11. 
The predicted probability who believe in neither individualistic nor structural explanations is 
about .13. Importantly, the difference in probabilities between individual and structural 
explanations is significantly different (p < .05). These results only somewhat support Hypotheses 
32 
 
1 and 2 in that African American respondents who believe in structural explanations for racial 
inequality have a lower probability of having trust in this institution while those who believe in 
individualistic explanations have a higher probability when holding all other variables constant. 
The regression coefficients from which these predicted probabilities are derived are presented in 
Table 5. The implications of this is discussed later on. 
Social trust  
Table 6 turns attention to trust in other people (i.e. their generally, fairness, helpfulness, 
and trustworthiness) rather than trust in institutions. The first model in the table regresses the 
social trust scale on beliefs about racial inequalities and control variables. When it comes to 
social trust, the scale ranges from about -.69 and about 1.66 units. The right-hand panel of figure 
1 illustrates this further. It contains the predicted values of social trust associated with each 
explanation for racial inequality. It shows that the predicted level of social trust is slightly 
although not significantly higher for people who attribute racial inequalities to structural causes 
than it is for those who believe in individual explanations. These results do not support 
hypotheses 3 and 4 in that African American respondents who believe in structural explanations 
for racial inequality have a higher probability of having trust in people while those who believe 
in individualistic explanations have a lower probability when holding all other variables 
constant. The implications of this is discussed later on, and the regression coefficients on which 
these results are based are presented in table 6 as well as figure 1. Table 6 also contains the 
results from the binary logit regressions for the three social trust items on the types of 
explanations for racial inequality and control variables. According to my models, the key 
variable measuring structural and individualistic beliefs about racial inequality did not have a 
statistically significant effect on whether respondents believed that they generally “can trust” 
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others, that people were generally helpful, nor that people were generally fair. I will now explore 
the implications of these results. 
[INSERT TABLE 6] 
DISCUSSION 
The latent variable for institutional trust reflects the overall pattern of the individual 
items, showing that African American respondents who believe in structural explanations for 
racial inequality have a lower probability of trust in institutions, while those who believe in 
individualistic explanations have a higher probability of trust in institutions. Overall, this makes 
some logical sense as it seems those who believe that racial inequality is caused by the 
shortcomings of individuals may have internalized the individualism of American culture, 
negative stereotypes about African Americans, and the color-blind ideology of the post-Civil 
Rights and post-Obama era, thus having no reason not to trust institutions (Bonilla-Silva 2015). 
In contrast, those who believe that it is caused by institutional racism may have personal 
experiences or knowledge of history that leads them to lack trust in institutions. Additionally, in 
some cases having a mixture of both structural and individualistic beliefs about racial inequality 
meant a higher probability of having trust in institutions than having either of those alone (e.g. 
trust in television and major companies). This study cannot decipher the meaning behind these 
patterns either, further complicating the results. 
It is important to examine the types of institutions that are impacted by respondents’ 
beliefs about racial inequality and in what direction the impact goes. Overall, seven of the 
thirteen institutions asked about on the GSS are impacted by beliefs about racial inequality, those 
being Congress, the Military, Television, Banks, Major Companies, Education, and the 
Executive Branch of the Federal Government. More than half of these are private institutions or 
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at least can be privately owned in the case of education and with the exception of Congress and 
the Military. While there was no significant association between explanations for racial 
inequality in the other six institutions, there were no instances where structural explanations were 
associated with more institutional confidence. The institutions that are not impacted by racial 
inequality beliefs—the US Supreme Court, the Science Community, Medicine, Organized 
Religion, Organized Labor, and the Press—are largely public institutions, or, like in the cases of 
the science community and the press, can be publicly funded. In all these instances, African 
American respondents who believe in structural explanations for racial inequality have a lower 
probability of having trust in that institution while those who believe in individualistic 
explanations have a higher probability of such.  
This may harken back to the previously discussed points about Black nationalist 
ideology, negative experiences with White people, and respondents’ overall perceptions of 
racism in American society (Aberbach and Walker 1970; Davis and Brown 2002; Sigelman and 
Tuch 1997; Stephan et al. 2002) which may impact their trust in these institutions, specifically 
ones which can sometimes be privately owned and funded. Perhaps, whether consciously or 
unconsciously, African Americans may view institutions that are often privately owned as 
extensions of the rich and largely White and male owners who they may perceive to be, if not 
racist, then at least complicit in institutional racism. For the executive branch of the federal 
government, respondents may largely associate this institution with the President of the United 
States alone. They then apply the same conscious or unconscious rationale as that of potentially 
private institutions where it is an extension of the person at the top. Another exception to this is 
organized religion, which is usually private. This may be because religion has played such a 
large role in community building and consciousness raising in the African American community 
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and so is not affected by beliefs about racial inequality. In addition, Congress and the Military 
are not private institutions, but are very visible in the way that those in power within these 
institutions have worked to exploit or oppress African Americans, such as laws created to 
disenfranchise them and then being asked to risk their lives to fight for a country that does so. 
However, this pattern is weak and very muddled and so can only count as a possible explanation 
for what we see in the data. 
Another possible explanation could be that some institutions are seen as more political 
than others. Most of the institutions that are impacted by beliefs about racial inequality—
Congress, the Military, Television, Banks, Major Companies, Education, and the Executive 
Branch of the Federal Government—are part of highly political realms and have the power to 
impact the life outcomes of African Americans. Congress and the Executive Branch, for 
example, are very visible parts of the federal governments with major officials who are elected 
by the people. Perhaps those who are elected into office represent the beliefs of the American 
public and also directly impact the laws and policies that govern them. If Black respondents 
believe in structural explanations for racial inequality, perhaps they don’t feel well represented 
by those elected officials and fear what policies they may put in place to further disenfranchise 
them. If they believe in individualistic explanations, perhaps they do feel sufficiently represented 
and if not totally trust than at least don’t fear the policies that are put in place.  
Moving on, the Military is a highly politicized institution as something seen as both 
complicit in the exploitation of Black people while also an opportunity to help individual Black 
people succeed. If Black respondents believe in structural explanations for racial inequality, then 
perhaps the history of segregation and exploitation are more salient to them and thus lack trust in 
this institution. In contrast, those who believe in individualistic explanations may see Military 
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service as a source of individual pride and ignore historical events. Television may be impacted 
by beliefs about racial inequality due to the debate around how Black people are portrayed in 
movies and TV. Those who believe in structural explanations may see the larger patterns of 
negative or one-dimensional portrayals of Black people while those who believe in 
individualistic explanations may not.  
Banks are politicized in the way they provide Black people opportunities to advance 
themselves socioeconomically, whether that be giving out loans, allowing bank accounts to be 
opened, or organizing credit. Those who believe in structural explanations for racial inequality 
may see patterns in the ways Banks create barriers to Black people achieving financial stability 
and building wealth, while those who believe in individualistic explanations may not see these as 
patterns related to race. Major companies can also be political in their levels of inclusivity, 
whether that be in the products they provide, their marketing, hiring, and promotion of 
employees into higher positions of power. Black respondents who believe in structural 
explanations for racial inequality may lack trust in many companies’ commitment to inclusivity 
and social equity whereas those who believe in individualistic explanations may not worry about 
these things on a larger scale.  
Finally, Education is a very politicized realm of society in the way that it directly impacts 
economic life outcomes. Black respondents who believe in structural explanations for racial 
inequality may see the way many schools are segregated by race and class and how many Black 
students are mistreated, ignored, and on a larger scale set on the school to prison pipeline. In 
contrast, Black respondents who believe in individualistic explanations may not see these as 
large-scale issues and so have no reason not to trust education. In all these institutions, the 
respondents who believe in individualistic explanations may not see those patterns where 
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political ideology plays a role in the way the institutions function and thus how they impact 
American citizens. They therefore have no reason to not trust them.  
The institutions not impacted by beliefs about racial inequality—the US Supreme Court, 
the Science Community, Medicine, Organized Religion, Organized Labor, and the Press—may 
not be so because of their supposed lack of politicization at least in respondents’ perceptions. 
Unlike Congress and the Executive Branch, The Supreme Court is not as visible, nor does it have 
members that are elected by the people. So, while they do have immense power over laws and 
policies, they may not be as directly impactful in the eyes of normal citizens. Science and 
Medicine may be seen as apolitical institutions as their impact of the life outcomes of African 
Americans is not so obvious. For Organized Religion, as stated earlier, the Black Church has had 
a huge and largely positive impact on Black culture. Black churches are also largely headed by 
Black leaders and so may be exempt from any political scrutiny. Organized labor has been a very 
salient political issue in the past, but it is unclear if it as salient during the years in which the 
GSS was taken in this study. In contrast, the press has not been seen as political in the past but 
may be becoming increasingly so. Perhaps in the future, the recent politicization of the press 
during the Trump administration may be reflected in the levels of trust people have in it and 
whether it is impacted by beliefs about racial inequality. While these inferences are interesting, it 
is hard to say whether they are accurate. In truth, the reasons why certain institutions are 
impacted by beliefs about racial inequality while others are not is difficult for me to decipher. 
Admittedly, it is hard for me to see an apparent pattern. Further research needs to be done on this 
topic. 
In contrast, the patterns for the impact of racial inequality beliefs on social trust are 
significantly different. Respondents with individualistic beliefs about racial inequality had a 
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lower probability of believing people were generally helpful than those with structural beliefs, a 
reversal of the predictions of hypotheses 3 and 4 as well as the patterns for the institutions. 
However, these patterns were not statistically significant for either the latent variable for social 
trust nor the individual social trust items. This illustrates that these beliefs do not have an impact 
on social trust. Perhaps this is due to how racism is thought to manifest, especially in the post-
Civil Rights era, where respondents understand racism to come from large structures and not 
from those around them (Bonilla-Silva 2015). This may at first seem to contradict the points 
proposed to explain the patterns with institutional trust, where African Americans seem to lack 
trust in the individuals in power within large institutions. However, I argue that there may be a 
difference in respondents’ minds between the trustworthiness of people in power and people in 
the general public. People in charge of those institutions have the power to oppress African 
Americans in ways that their neighbors cannot. These not only have a larger impact on their lives 
but they also have the ability to gaslight African Americans in their experiences since many of 
these processes are invisible. So then, African Americans have more reason to distrust those in 
power than those around them. However, due to the nature of this study, it is impossible to know 
the true rationale behind respondents’ feelings and what social and psychological mechanisms 
inform their beliefs. We can only make inferences based on the patterns we find. Further 
research needs to be done on this topic, perhaps qualitative, in order to understand the meaning 
behind these patterns. 
CONCLUSION 
 I sought to examine the relationship between beliefs about racial inequality and 
institutional and social trust in African Americans. I hypothesized that those who subscribe to 
structural explanations will be less likely to have institutional and social trust while those who 
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subscribe to individualistic explanations will be more likely to have institutional and social trust. 
I found that there was only support for this regarding institutional trust. Even still, African 
Americans are a unique social group that deserve to be studied on their own terms so to 
understand the heterogeneity and complexity in their experiences and worldview. Even now as I 
write this, racial issues are much different than they were in 2018, the most recent GSS survey 
year. I hope this research can contribute to the literature on public conceptions of racial 




Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables 
Variable Mean/proportion Range 
Institutional Trust -0.111  -1.58 -1.48 
US Supreme Court 0.202  0-1 
Scientific Community 0.268  0-1 
US Congress 0.118  0-1 
US Military 0.395  0-1 
Television 0.143  0-1 
Medicine 0.361  0-1 
Banks & Financial Institutions 0.19  0-1 
Major Companies 0.133  0-1 
Organized Religion 0.231  0-1 
Education 0.32  0-1 
Exec. Branch 0.12  0-1 
Organized Labor 0.129  0-1 
The Press 0.123  0-1 
Social Trust 0.026  -.69 - 1.66 
Helpful 0.403  0-1 
Fair 0.327  0-1 
Trustworthy 0.151  0-1 







Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables 
Variable  Mean/proportion Range 
Racial inequality due to discrimination 1.365 1-2 
Racial inequality due to inborn disability 1.865 1-2 
Racial inequality due to lack of education  1.44 1-2 
Racial inequality due to lack of will power 1.573 1-2 
Explanations for Racial Inequality  2.502  1-4  
 Individual  0.131  0-1 
 Mixed  0.328  0-1 
 Structural  0.453  0-1 
 None  0.089  0-1 
Female 0.578 0-1 
Lives in the South 0.549 0-1 
Church Attendance 4.309 1-9 
Political Views 3.9  1-7 
Income 22,628.11 227-155,140 
Years of Education 12.828 1-20 
Age 41.815 18-89 















US Congress US Military Television Medicine 
Explanations for 
racial inequality 
       
    Mixed -0.160** -0.008 -0.530* -0.286 -0.454* -0.009 0.085 
 (0.055) (0.245) (0.229) (0.283) (0.213) (0.295) (0.227) 
    Structural -0.197*** 0.031 -0.383 -0.611* -0.442* -0.603* 0.002 
 (0.049) (0.242) (0.214) (0.269) (0.205) (0.297) (0.212) 
    None -0.062 0.052 -0.280 -0.539 -0.339 -0.337 -0.094 
 (0.067) (0.322) (0.305) (0.413) (0.270) (0.396) (0.296) 
Female -0.106** -0.432** -0.554*** -0.258 -0.583*** -0.680*** -0.414** 
 (0.035) (0.166) (0.148) (0.203) (0.131) (0.194) (0.141) 
Years of Education -0.025*** -0.103** -0.037 -0.129** -0.077** -0.150*** -0.074** 
 (0.007) (0.035) (0.029) (0.041) (0.027) (0.033) (0.027) 
Age -0.000 -0.009 -0.005 -0.007 -0.003 -0.002 -0.012* 
 (0.001) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) 
Ln(income) -0.047** -0.071 0.008 -0.167* -0.035 -0.250** -0.109 
 (0.015) (0.067) (0.066) (0.083) (0.063) (0.076) (0.064) 
Lives in South 0.070* 0.120 -0.039 0.195 0.219 0.227 0.055 
 (0.034) (0.164) (0.148) (0.211) (0.135) (0.186) (0.128) 
Church Attendance 0.017* 0.001 -0.025 -0.016 0.050 -0.011 0.015 
 (0.008) (0.030) (0.030) (0.038) (0.027) (0.036) (0.028) 
Political Views -0.007 -0.001 -0.003 -0.029 -0.017 -0.014 0.000 
 (0.013) (0.055) (0.053) (0.072) (0.049) (0.068) (0.047) 
Constant 0.912*** -0.008 -0.530* -0.286 -0.454* 3.495*** 2.474*** 
 (0.171) (0.812) (0.758) (0.950) (0.705) (0.891) (0.708) 
Observations 1,412 1,382 1,412 1,412 1,412 1,412 1,412 
R-Squared 0.111       
Statistics in table are unstandardized regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Fixed effects for survey year are omitted 
from table. Reference groups are “Individual,” “Male,” and “does not live in the South.” Continuous items are modeled using OLS 
regression and binary items are modeled using binary logit regression. Source: General Social Survey  




Table 4:  Predicted Probabilities for each racial inequality explanation 
 Explanations for Racial Inequality 
Items Individual Mixed Structural None 
Congress .161 .129 .099 .105 
Military .481 .377 .380 .403 
Television .174 .173 .108 .134 
Banks .258 .205 .151 .222 
Companies .174 .176 .092 .141 
Education .445 .340 .253 .374 
Exec Branch .183 .113 .106 .135 







Table 5: Unstandardized regression coefficients for Institutional Trust 











Explanations for racial 
inequality 
       
    Mixed -0.322 0.011 0.022 -0.480* -0.595* 0.351 -0.087 
 (0.235) (0.262) (0.235) (0.219) (0.277) (0.316) (0.298) 
    Structural -0.714** -0.749** 0.019 -0.928*** -0.665* 0.008 -0.038 
 (0.238) (0.268) (0.235) (0.224) (0.268) (0.318) (0.279) 
    None -0.209 -0.262 0.209 -0.320 -0.380 0.110 -0.282 
 (0.327) (0.361) (0.310) (0.266) (0.386) (0.406) (0.434) 
Female -0.161 -0.341 -0.463** -0.096 -0.288 -0.159 -0.415* 
 (0.165) (0.182) (0.159) (0.142) (0.210) (0.193) (0.188) 
Years of Education -0.140*** -0.054 -0.127*** -0.086** -0.041 -0.079* -0.097* 
 (0.033) (0.040) (0.035) (0.028) (0.040) (0.037) (0.044) 
Age -0.020** -0.016* -0.004 -0.009 -0.000 -0.004 -0.006 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Ln(income) -0.135 -0.006 -0.192** -0.294*** -0.167* -0.157 -0.241*** 
 (0.077) (0.082) (0.066) (0.068) (0.083) (0.080) (0.070) 
Lives in South 0.031 0.232 0.228 0.306* 0.387 0.075 -0.148 
 (0.168) (0.181) (0.164) (0.148) (0.221) (0.196) (0.191) 
Church Attendance 0.060* 0.039 0.164*** -0.001 0.016 0.006 0.082* 
 (0.030) (0.037) (0.031) (0.028) (0.040) (0.037) (0.038) 
Political Views 0.003 0.025 0.008 0.013 0.011 -0.004 -0.053 
 (0.061) (0.068) (0.059) (0.050) (0.081) (0.071) (0.069) 
Constant 2.934*** -0.258 1.839* 4.209*** 0.652 0.724 2.435** 
 (0.771) (0.863) (0.765) (0.746) (0.940) (0.901) (0.870) 
Observations 1,412 1,382 1,412 1,412 1,382 1,412 1,412 
Statistics in table are unstandardized regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Fixed effects for survey year are omitted 
from table. Reference groups are “Individual,” “Male,” and “does not live in the South.” Binary items are modeled using binary logit 
regression. Source: General Social Survey  




Table 6: Unstandardized regression coefficients for Social Trust 
VARIABLES Social Trust Helpful Fair Trust 
     
Explanations for racial 
inequality 
    
   Mixed -0.046 0.003 -0.071 -0.488 
 (0.073) (0.223) (0.243) (0.324) 
   Structural 0.066 0.137 0.181 -0.289 
 (0.075) (0.217) (0.231) (0.317) 
   None 0.196 0.784** 0.408 -0.289 
 (0.100) (0.285) (0.300) (0.414) 
Female 0.020 0.105 0.274 -0.295 
 (0.044) (0.139) (0.140) (0.188) 
Years of Edu 0.058*** 0.098*** 0.116*** 0.228*** 
 (0.010) (0.028) (0.030) (0.046) 
Age 0.009*** 0.019*** 0.025*** 0.023*** 
 (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Ln(income) 0.067*** 0.144* 0.207** 0.254* 
 (0.017) (0.062) (0.070) (0.099) 
Lives in South -0.086 -0.112 -0.296* -0.205 
 (0.044) (0.132) (0.135) (0.185) 
Church Attendance 0.018 0.052 0.065* 0.003 
 (0.009) (0.026) (0.030) (0.039) 
Political Views -0.019 -0.073 -0.005 -0.083 
 (0.016) (0.049) (0.051) (0.075) 
Constant -0.046 0.003 -0.071 -0.488 
 (0.073) (0.223) (0.243) (0.324) 
Observations 1,412 1,412 1,412 1,412 
R-Squared 0.146    
Statistics in table are unstandardized regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Fixed effects for survey year are omitted from table. Reference groups are “Individual,” “Male,” 
and “does not live in the South.” Continuous items are modeled using OLS regression and binary 
items are modeled using binary logit regression. Source: General Social Survey  
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